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13 April 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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USSR: The extraordinary alteration in the May Day slogan concerning Yugoslavia suggests the continuation of considerable differences within the top Soviet leadership.

The change, which moves Yugoslavia into the category of a country "building socialism," bears upon a fundamental issue in the Soviet Union's dispute with China. As recently as 30 March, in its letter to the Chinese, Moscow reaffirmed that it considered Yugoslavia a "socialist" country. On 3 April, Khrushchev met with Yugoslav leader Vukmanovic-Tempo and told him that the Soviet position was firm on Yugoslavia's being a socialist state and would not be changed.

Omission of the reference to "building socialism" in the slogan as first published on 8 April suggests, therefore, that a difference of opinion on this question arose which resulted in the use of the same formula concerning Yugoslavia that has been in use since 1958. It is also possible, however, that the original slogan was published at the instigation of leaders who saw in Khrushchev's absence on vacation an opportunity to indicate their disagreement with some of his policies.

The alteration of the slogan is unprecedented and reflects the importance which Khrushchev attaches to this particular issue. The delay in making the change from 8 to 11 April, however, suggests that Khrushchev may have had difficulty in reasserting his position. The correction will drive home the intention of Khrushchev and his followers in the leadership to insist on their fundamental doctrinal position in their bilateral talks with the Chinese.

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DAILY BRIEF

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*Congo: [Adoula's announcement that he intends to release Antoine Gizenga, the leftist former Stanleyville leader, is aimed at relieving parliamentary pressures on the government.]

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[Gizenga's strength lies in what he can draw from his self-appointed role as the "heir" to the late Patrice Lumumba, and not from any personal brilliance, leadership ability, or popular following. Although in the free-for-all of Congo politics his image may tarnish, he could serve as a rallying point and front man for extremist elements.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

Peru: ~~R~~umors are increasing that the armed forces officer corps may soon force further changes in the membership of the ruling military junta in order to obtain the indefinite suspension of the elections scheduled for next June. The military, strongly opposed as always to Haya de la Torre's APRA party, are apparently apprehensive that the present junta will fail to prevent an APRA victory in the elections. Leaders of APRA have threatened that the party would "fight" if the military interfered in the elections.

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DAILY BRIEF

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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